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ABSTRACT 
The Chinese government imposed the housing purchase restriction policy to dampen the 
speculation in 2010. Using a two-stage difference-in-difference approach and a 
comprehensive dataset covering the real estate markets across 70 cities, we find that the 
policy triggered substantial decline in the property price and transaction volume. Cities 
having higher reliance on real estate sector for fiscal revenue and economic growth 
experienced greater decline in housing prices following the policy implementation. 
However, the policy had no measurable effects on the nationwide construction boom, 
hinting the ineffectiveness of the policy to correct the housing bubble. 
 
Keywords: housing purchase restriction policy, housing bubble, China, difference in 
difference 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Considerable evidences indicate that collapses in real estate prices are the main cause 
of many financial crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). Policymakers are now more in 
favors of early interventions to curtail the housing bubbles (IMF, 2011). It is therefore 
crucial to design effective macroprudential regulations. An emerging literature has begun 
to explore the effects of government interventions on the property market (Allen and 
Carletti, 2011; Almeida et al., 2006; Crowe et al., 2013; Igan and Kang, 2011; Kannan et 
al., 2012; Wong et al., 2011). However, we still know little about the effectiveness and 
difficulties in implementing various policy tools, especially from an empirical 
perspective.  
China provides a compelling setting to study this issue for several reasons. First, 
within less than two decades, residential property prices in China have gone through a 
strong growing trend with occasional ups and downs. A study by the MacDonald et al. 
(2012) shows that property prices in China have increased at a compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR) of around 16% between 2005 and 2011, much higher than the 13% recorded 
in the U.S. housing market between 2000 and 2005. The central concern now is whether 
the Chinese housing market is at the peak of the bubble such that a significant correction 
would trigger a systematic risk to the financial market.  
Second, real estate sector is one of the main drivers for Chinese economic growth. It 
accounts for roughly one-sixth of GDP growth, 25% of total fixed asset investment, 14% 
of total urban employment and 20% of bank loans (IMF, 2014). Furthermore, the sector 
has strong linkage effects on both upstream and downstream industries. Many consider 
that Chinese housing market is too important to fail because local governments rely 
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heavily on real estate-related income, land sales in particular, as a source of fiscal 
revenue.  
Third, as the world’s second largest economy and the largest trading nation, a sharp 
slowdown in the property sector could have a domino effect on the world economy 
because China is the largest purchaser of commodities like copper, iron ore, coal, oil, etc. 
in the global market. Ahuja and Myrovda (2012) predict that a 10% reduction in China’s 
real estate investment would shave about 1% off China’s real GDP within the first year 
and cause global output to decline by roughly 0.5% from the baseline.  
Forth, the Chinese government has been actively intervening in the housing market 
to rein in the rampant housing price surge through various monetary and fiscal policy 
tools such as the increase of minimum down payment ratio, cap on the loan-to-value ratio, 
higher mortgage rate for second house, taxes on capital gains, and so on. When the 
effectiveness of these traditional policies diminished, the Chinese government recoursed 
to the heavy-handed regulation of housing purchase restriction (HPR) to curtail the 
speculation. This provides a rare opportunity to study such a less standard 
macroprudential tool and its impact on the whole real estate sector. 
 Starting from May 2010, 39 of the 70 Chinese cities whose housing prices are 
regularly surveyed by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) introduced the HPR policy. 
Different from the nationwide implementation of monetary and fiscal cooling measures, 
the HPR policy is decentralized and voluntary. The central government only provides 
guidelines that the policy should be implemented in the first-tier cities and can be 
extended to the second- and even third-tier cities on a need basis1, rather than mandated 
                                                          
1
 In China, a widely-adopted city classification system categorizes all cities into three tiers in terms of their 
population, economic size, development of services, infrastructure and cosmopolitan nature. The first-tier 
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by all cities. Under this policy, only those with local hukou (household registration), or 
those who can prove they have worked in the city for certain consecutive years, are 
eligible to purchase one or two new homes.  
This paper presents a systematic evaluation of China’s HPR policy with a city-level 
quarterly panel data that comprises of various real estate market indicators, including  
housing prices, rental rates, transaction volume, investment and construction of property 
by developers, land price and sales revenue received by local governments for the years 
of 2008 to 2013. We follow Donald and Lang (2007) and Greenstone and Hanna (2014)2 
to form our empirical strategy. The autonomous and heterogeneous adoption of the policy 
in each city enables us to employ the two-stage difference-in-difference (DD) approach to 
address the endogeneity concerns associated with each city’s selection into HPR policy. 
We treat those cities without adopting the HPR policy as a control group and draw the 
causality inference of the policy effect on the property market. Further, we perform a 
structural break test as a robustness check on the validity of the DD design. We also 
investigate the variation of policy effects across cities, accounting for their 
heterogeneities in the fiscal reliance on land sales, economic dependence on real estate 
investment and pace of urban expansion.   
We find that the HPR policy has a moderately negative impact on the official 
housing price index released by the NBS. Considering the potential possibility of data 
manipulation, we alternatively investigate the policy impact on the transaction prices of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
cities refer to the megacities of Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen and Guangzhou which are well recognized for 
being densely populated as well as culturally and economically influential. The capital city of each 
province and regional economic centers are classified as the second-tier cities while the rests are the third-
tier cities. 
2
 Greenstone and Hanna (2014) adopt a Quandt likelihood ratio test (Quandt, 1960) from the time-series 
econometrics and develop a new method of the structural break test for the DD setting.  
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secondary houses compiled by a nationwide private agent -- the City House, and discover 
large decrease in the housing price. Moreover, the HPR policy causes significant and 
sharp plunge in the transaction volume of new houses. This evidence is consistent with 
the policy motivation of curbing speculative demand in the property market. In terms of 
magnitude, the housing price on average dropped by 18.3% while the sales amount 
plummeted by 60% four quarters following the policy implementation. However, the 
policy does not address the problem of excessive supply of housing market. We find that 
the growing trend of property investment and construction do not alter after the policy 
enforcement. These findings suggest that property developers largely ignore the intention 
of the policy in curbing property boom but continue to pile up future supply of houses.  
Cross-sectional tests show that local governments may overly rely on real estate 
sector to gain fiscal revenue and achieve the economic growth by pushing property prices 
into unsustainable levels. Those cities having higher reliance on land sales and real estate 
investment and radical urban sprawl experienced greater decline in housing prices and 
sales following the policy adoption but no significant fall in property investment or 
construction. The latter evidence suggests that HPR policy’s effectiveness is limited due 
to local authorities’ misaligned incentives and circumvention.  
Our research contributes to the literature that studies the implications of regulations 
and how a specific policy may affect the market. Chinese housing cooling policy is 
different from that of other countries in the sense that government has the advantage of 
an autocratic approach to target the speculation by imposing purchase restriction. This 
novel policy warrants a systematic evaluation given the sheer size of Chinese housing 
market. Our empirical evidence reveals that the HPR policy is effective in tame the 
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speculation and contain the associated risk. However, it does not solve the mismatches 
between housing supply and demand and the distortion of resource allocation because the 
policy has no measurable effect in curtailing the nationwide property construction boom.  
This means that local governments would only dampen demand temporarily but not 
supply since they rely heavily on land sales or property sectors for their economic target. 
The overall alarming evidences imply the ineffectiveness of such policy to correct the 
property bubbles, rather only to defer it. 
The rest of paper is organized as follows. The next section surveys the changes of 
government policies toward residential property market since 1998 and reviews the 
relevant literature. Section 3 presents the data source and summary statistics. Section 4 
describes the empirical methods used in this study, and section 5 reports the empirical 
results. Section 6 assesses the differences of policy effect across cities and section 7 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
The Chinese government has interfered actively and significantly in the private 
housing market since the country terminated the welfare housing distribution system in 
1998. Its policy stance is modified as the economic climate changes and has gone through 
several stages of amendments. Ahuja et al. (2010) found that over the past decade, any 
misalignment in house prices in China would be corrected relatively quickly due to 
government intervention.  
Since the mid-1990s, to support the housing reform and fight against the adverse 
economic impacts arising from 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the Chinese government has 
made great efforts to promote housing finance and hence stimulate the growth of real 
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estate sector. For example, between 1998 and 2002, it lowered the mortgage interest rate 
five times to encourage home purchases. By 2005, China has become the largest 
residential mortgage market in Asia, with an outstanding balance exceeding two trillion 
Yuan, almost 89 times the 1997 balance (Deng and Liu 2009; Zhu 2006). Meanwhile, it 
developed policies favoring housing development, such as broadening the scope of 
development loans and allowing pre-sales. As a result, the annual housing investment 
increased by around six times from 1997 to 2005 (Ye & Wu, 2008). 
In response to the significant housing price spikes, the Chinese government 
implemented a series of monetary and fiscal policies to curtail speculative activities after 
early 2004. For example, the minimum down payment ratio was raised to 40% in 
September 2007, mortgage rate to be 10% higher than the benchmark rate. And personal 
income taxes were levied on corporate purchasing properties for individuals in 2008. 
These measures worked well for a short period, partially aided by the global financial 
crisis broken out in 2007. 
In order to avoid the paramount threat of political instability implied by falling 
export earnings and employment triggered by the global financial crisis, the government 
abruptly reversed its policies in October 2008 to put in place a series of measures to 
support the housing market recovery. Among others, the minimum mortgage rates were 
adjusted downwards to 70% of the benchmark rate and the down-payment ratio was 
lowered to 20%. Preferential policies were also introduced for first-time home buyers. 
Reinforcing this recovery was a post-global financial crisis stimulus package introduced 
by the central government, designating the real estate sector as one of the primary 
industries. Hence, after a short and moderate correction in 2008, the overall financial 
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conditions were relaxed. Fueled by a vast increase in the credit provided by the state-
owned banks and companies, the housing market regained momentum in mid-2009 and 
started a new round housing price surge and massive construction boom across the 
nation3.  
In response to the continuing surge in housing prices, the government stepped up a 
campaign against the overheated property market in the early 2010. Besides the 
traditional policy tools, various less standard tightening measures, such as raising the 
down-payment ratio, prohibiting mortgage on second home purchase, and imposing 
business tax and personal income taxes on housing transactions came in place. However, 
none can be compared to the most stringent policy instrument -- housing purchase 
restriction adopted by various Chinese local municipalities. Taking Beijing as an example, 
the policy dictates that each family with Beijing hukou can own a maximum of two 
homes while families without local hukou are not allowed to buy any more unless they 
can provide documents to prove the payment of taxes and social security contributions 
for the previous five consecutive years (Sun et al., 2013). The goal of the HPR policy is 
to curtail the speculative housing demand, although it does not touch the fundamentals 
motivating the speculative demand, say the shortage of investment tools for Chinese 
residents.4 Such restrictions on housing purchase substantially alters the demand in the 
housing market and are often criticized by the economists for its unfairness, 
discrimination against migrants, and inefficiency for its administrative nature. 
                                                          
3
 According to Smil (2013), between 2011 and 2013, China used 6.6 gigatonnes of cement, 1.1 gigatonnes 
more than what the US used between 1901 and 2000. 
4
 Real estate is the most preferred asset class for the Chinese thanks to the shortage of other investment 
options and a lack of property taxes. According to a Report “China—real estate: Good news in tough times” 
released by the Standard Chartered on 4 July 2013, residential property has made up more than 60% of 
household assets since 2008, dwarfing the 48 % in the UK, 32 % in Japan, and 26% in the US. 
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Since the late 2013, an alarming economic slowdown emerged with residential 
property market receding. Housing prices started to decline in an increasing number of 
cities while the residential property inventories have increased sharply. Not affording to 
sit idle and watch the free fall of housing price, most municipal authorities abolished the 
HPR policy in the mid-2014. Currently, the housing purchase restriction policy is only in 
force in four megacities of Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenzhen.  
Not surprisingly, China’s housing market has been the topics of many empirical 
investigations. Some attempt to explain the underlying factors that caused the house price 
movement (Zhou, 2005; Glindro et al. 2005), some focus on the price misalignment and 
the sustainability of China’s housing boom (Ahuja et al., 2010, Barth et al., 2012; 
Economic Intelligence Unit 2011; Ren et al., 2012; Wu et al. 2010;), some investigate the 
relationship between Chinese stock and housing market (Huang et al.,  2014), and others 
look at the association of housing price with land policy (Cai et al., 2009; Du et al., 2010; 
Peng and Thibodeau, 2009). Fang et al (2014) measure the corruption of housing 
purchase in China. Although the Chinese government has actively intervened in the real 
estate sector, especially in light of US subprime mortgage crisis, very few studies have 
examine the impact of government cooling measures. Most research focuses only on the 
introduction and evolution of the policies, such as Wang and Murie (1999), Deng et al. 
(2011) and Zou (2014), Ahuja, et al (2010) and Barth et al. (2012).  
Despite the vitriolic critics on the heavy-handed government restriction on housing 
purchase, there are few researches systematically assess its impact on Chinese real estate 
market. To our knowledge, there are only two papers examining the policy impact on an 
individual market. Sun et al. (2013) investigate the policy effect on Beijing’s resale and 
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rental market while Jia et al. (2014) focus on the response of Guangzhou’s real estate 
sector to the policy implementation. In this paper, we aim to bridge the gap by 
assembling a set of empirical facts about real estate market dynamics in relation to the 
HPR policy adopted by many Chinese local municipalities. 
 
3. DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
This section describes the data source, presents the summary statistics, and traces the 
evolution of the key property market indicators before and after the policy 
implementation. 
3.1 Data Source 
We mainly use the NBS, CEIC and China Real Estate Index System (CREIS) as the 
data source while also collect transaction price and rental rates from a nationwide real 
estate agent--the City House. The CREIS database is built up by the China Index 
Academy which is currently the largest Chinese independent property research 
organization and provides a comprehensive data on property transaction, land auction and 
property developers. Our data covers 70 cities across 30 provincial units for the years of 
2008-2013 at quarterly frequency. The sample selection is mainly due to the data 
availability at the NBS. Figure A1 in the appendix plots the location of these 70 cities and 
classify them into two groups -- restricted and unrestricted cities while Table A1 lists the 
definition, unit and sources of each variable.  
A. HPR Policy  
The HPR policy was initiated by China’s central government under the so-called 
“New National Ten Articles” and “New National Eight Articles” issued in April 2010 
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and January 2011 respectively5. It was afterward implemented in 39 of the 70 cities in our 
sample. Hand collecting the local version of “New National Ten Articles” and “New 
National Eight Articles”, we assemble a dataset that systematically documents the policy 
changes. Table A2 lists the policy implementation status of all our sample cities. Beijing 
was the first city to enforce the HPR in May 2010, followed by Shenzhen in September, 
Dalian, Fuzhou, Hangzhou, Xiamen, Guangzhou and Wenzhou in October, and Lanzhou 
and Zhengzhou in November and December respectively. In the spring of 2011, due to 
the requirements set by the “New National Eight Articles”, the other 29 municipal 
governments launched the HPR policy in their cities.  
B. Real Estate Market Indicators 
We use twelve indicators to capture the dynamics of Chinese residential property 
market, i.e., property price index, sales price, rental rates, sales amount, number of flats 
sold, floor space sold, real estate investment, floor space started and under construction, 
land price and land sales revenue.  
We first construct a price index from the sales price indices of newly constructed 
(PINew) and secondary residential property (PISecond) published by the NBS . The main 
advantage of this data set is its wide coverage and long sample period. For our full 
sample of 70 cities, the starting date of NBS price indices could be traced back to July 
2005. The NBS reports the year-over-year or quarter-over-quarter house price growth rate 
for individual cities. To track the price movement over time, we convert it into the 
                                                          
5 The full name of “New Ten Clauses” is “Notice of the State Council on Resolutely Curbing the Soaring 
of Housing Prices in Some Cities” while the full name of “New National Eight Articles” is “Notice of the 
State Council on further problems related to the intervention of real estate market”.  
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indices with the second quarter of 2005 equal to 100.6  One drawback of NBS property 
price index is data manipulation that may underestimate the housing price appreciation 
(Ahuja et al., 2010; Barth et al. 2012; Wu et al., 2010). We hence collect the transaction 
price of the secondary houses (Price.Cityhouse) from a nationwide independent agent--
the City House whose data is free of manipulation problem.  We also adopt its quarterly 
rental price to measure the dynamics of rental market.  
The data for sales amount (SaleAmount), number of flats sold (SaleUnit), floor space 
sold (SaleFloor) are only available for new homes. We obtain the data for these 
transaction indicators as well as real estate investment by the real estate developers 
(Investment), floor space started (FloorStarted) and under construction 
(FloorUnderConstruction),  land price (LandPrice) and land sales revenue (LandRevenue) 
received by the local governments from the CEIC and CREIS.  
C. Control Variables 
Housing price is usually pushed up disproportionately when the economic growth 
gathers momentum because the supply of nontradable goods such as housing is inelastic. 
It is believed that the demand factors for housing are likely to remain strong throughout 
the next decade (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2011; Chen et al. 2011). In this paper, 
disposable income per capita of urban residents and resident population of each city are 
adopted to measure the demand for property and control for the real estate market 
dynamics. The data of disposable income is obtained from the CEIC. There are two kinds 
of population data in China, i.e. huji population and changzhu population. The huji 
population refers to people who registered with the police under the household 
                                                          
6
 The base period could be set as other periods, but the evolutions of the price index are the same and hence 
the empirical results would not be affected.  
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registration system but does not include residents living in the city without local hukou, 
whereas the changzhu population refers to the resident population that has stayed in the 
same area for more than 6 months and reflects the migration pattern. For a coastal city 
where the manufacturing industry concentrates and hence becomes the residence of 
numerous migrants, the huji population might underestimate the total number of residents. 
For an inland city that is the home of migrants, the huji population might overestimate its 
total residents. To avoid this bias, we collect the data of changzhu population from the 
yearbooks of each city or province because changzhu population instead of huji 
population represents the real potential demand for urban residential housing. 
3.2 Summary Statistics 
We apply the seasonality adjustment to the series of property investment, floor space 
started and under construction, land sales revenue and disposable income that show 
evident seasonal fluctuations. Panel A of Table 1 lists the summary statistics of all 
variables for the full sample of 70 cities. The mean of property price index (PINew and 
PISecond) indicates that the housing price on average grows by around 35% since 2005, 
much lower than the appreciation rate estimated by MacDonald et al. (2012). In terms of 
the absolute value, the mean value of sales price published by the City House is around 
RMB 7,700 per square meter. In contrast to the high housing price, the average rental 
price is as low as around RMB 20 per square meter only. The transaction volume 
averages 13,632 units of flats, 1.39 million square meters of floor space valuing for RMB 
11,765 million per quarter.  
Driven by the considerable amount of investment by the real estate developers which 
is as large as RMB 12,144 million for each city per quarter, the construction of residential 
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property is growing at an extraordinarily high pace in the last few years. Our summary 
statistics indicate that there is on average around 2 million square meter of floor space 
started and 22.3 million square meter of floor space under construction per city-quarter. 
The quarterly land sales revenue for each city amounts averagely to RMB 3.7 billion at a 
price of RMB 4,527 per square meter. The local governments, the ultimate owner and the 
only supplier of urban lands, are therefore one of the largest beneficiaries of the 
skyrocketing property market.  
To assess the volatility of housing market, we normalized standard deviation of each 
variable by its mean. Among all the nine property market indicators, the property 
investment, floor space started, sales amount, land price and land sales revenue exhibit 
highest level of volatility as their normalized standard deviation all exceed one.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the mean value of real estate market indicators around 
the time of policy implementation for adopting cities. Although the HPR policy was 
launched to dampen the rampant housing price appreciation, the official price indicators -
- PINew and PISecond  declined by only around 1 and 3 point four quarters after the 
policy implementation. However, the decline in the housing price released by the private 
agent (price.Cityhouse) is remarkable. It fell by RMB 364 four quarters after the policy 
adoption. 
One year after the policy enforcement, the three measurements of new home sales 
including the SaleAmount, SaleUnit and SaleFloor plummeted by more than 40% relative 
to their peak value recorded at  = −1. The dramatic decline in the sales volume hints 
that most of housing purchase before the policy adoption might be driven by the 
speculation purpose, instead of consumption needs. Cities adopting the policy on average 
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experienced a 60% drop in land sales revenue. It is therefore not surprising to see the 
local governments promptly abolished the HPR policy when the Central government 
decided to loosen control on the property market in the summer of 2014. On the contrary, 
the investment and construction of residential properties are unaffected by the policy. 
They continued their growing trend one year after the policy implementation. This would 
unavoidably lead to the oversupply of residential housing. 
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Table 1 Summary statistics 
This table presents the summary statistics of our key variables. Panel A shows the summary statistics of real estate 
market indicators of all cities. Panel B summarizes the statistics for the adopting cities around the time of policy 
implementation. Normalized Std. Dev. is calculated as the ratio of Std. Dev. to the mean. 
Panel A: Summary statistics for all cities 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Normalized Std. Dev. Min Max 
PINew 1680 138.05 20.21 0.15 90.99 226.49 
PISecond 1680 135.68 22.65 0.17 84.10 234.75 
priceCityhouse 1550 7730.66 5099.41 0.66 1943.00 37469.00 
Rental 1585 19.99 9.27 0.46 5.50 65.05 
SaleUnit 992 13632.13 12249.75 0.90 571.00 73875.00 
SaleFloor 1015 1390.30 1213.42 0.87 55.50 8058.20 
SaleAmount 903 11764.59 13965.61 1.19 193.00 101534.00 
Investment 1680 12144.03 14448.50 1.19 115.43 93929.22 
FloorStarted 1680 2010.10 1906.28 0.95 0.00 16812.08 
FloorUnderConstruction 1680 22333.40 21648.64 0.97 234.50 192489.00 
LandPrice 1471 4527.22 5239.26 1.16 4.43 60293.88 
LandRevenue 1471 3694.32 6672.21 1.81 0.05 80074.93 
Panel B: Mean value of real estate market indicators for the adopting cities around the policy implementation 
 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
PINew 138.28 139.81 141.22 143.29 145.14 146.07 145.86 144.98 144.15 
PISecond 138.19 139.55 140.78 142.32 143.23 143.39 142.27 141.19 140.09 
priceCityhouse 9124.90 9555.41 10174.77 10724.21 10977.28 10963.41 10772.95 10770.77 10613.13 
Rental 21.97 22.81 23.52 23.65 24.44 24.67 25.06 24.60 24.94 
SaleUnit 14880.43 15055.57 17560.71 19765.07 14863.41 12865.93 12978.78 11456.18 10755.12 
SaleFloor 1573.20 1607.76 1738.77 1974.80 1492.44 1278.42 1295.46 1130.67 1063.71 
SaleAmount 13031.00 13925.27 16108.59 18109.85 14050.19 12876.00 13389.93 11455.48 10624.62 
Investment 13648.27 15284.35 15508.42 16920.77 17545.47 18835.70 19823.24 20998.12 21600.04 
FloorStarted 2290.80 2621.90 2912.14 2851.10 2848.54 3090.66 3166.57 2739.77 2943.89 
FloorUnderConstruction 21655.61 24674.72 28041.27 28562.54 26595.68 30409.93 34059.92 34416.36 31753.29 
LandPrice 5705.37 6740.24 6723.63 6854.01 6696.27 6680.35 5242.33 5650.43 7035.17 
LandRevenue 8273.31 6255.83 6058.68 8655.79 7055.47 5877.19 4238.21 3064.45 4023.23 
 
4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
This section describes a two-stage DD approach developed by Donald and Lang 
(2007) and recently applied by Greenstone and Hanna (2014) to study the effects of 
environmental regulations on pollution abatement in India. We employ it to assess the 
impacts of HPR policy on the dynamics of Chinese real estate market. This approach 
18 
 
provides a convenient solution to the problem of intragroup correlation in the unobserved 
determinants of housing market dynamics. It is numerically equivalent to the GLS and 
FGLS approaches widely applied for single-stage DD approach, but avoids the 
difficulties of collapsing the data into group-level.7 The first stage is a typical event 
study-style equation:  
               =  + ∑  , +  +  +  +                                         (1) 
where  is one of the twelve measurements of real estate market dynamics in city i at 
quarter t. ,  is a vector composed of a separate indicator variable for each of the 
quarters before and after the policy is enforced.  is normalized to be zero in the quarter 
when the policy is implemented and ranges from -8 (8 quarters before a policy is adopted) 
to 8 (8 quarters after its adoption) so that we have enough city-by-quarter observations 
before and after the policy implementation. All s are set to zero for the nonadopting 
cities so as to facilitate the identification of time effects and the coefficients of s on the 
control variables. The city fixed effects,  , control for all unobserved factors across cities  
and prevent the estimates of the treatment effects, s, from being biased upward by the 
possibly higher levels of real estate market indicators in the adopting cities, both before 
and after the policy implementation (Auffhammer and Kellogg, 2011). The inclusion of 
time effects  adjusts for national trends. The control variables of disposable income per 
capita and resident population () adjust for differential demand-side factors across 
cities. To account for differences in precision due to city economic development level, 
the estimating equation is weighted by the GDP per capita. 
                                                          
7
 We also performed estimation with the single-stage approach for comparison. Results are available upon 
request. As a standard practice in DD approach, the standard errors from the one-stage approach are 
clustered at the city-level. 
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 The parameters, s, which are of our main interests, gauge the average value of 
twelve measurements of real estate market dynamics in the quarters before and after the 
policy is enforced. The variation in the timing of the HPR policy adoption across cities 
enables us to identify the  s and the time fixed effects separately. A plot of  s 
estimated from equation (1) against the s would allow us to visually investigate how the 
policy changes the real estate market. Additionally, these figures, which lend insights into 
whether the mean reversion appears in front of the policy’s impact, would inform us the 
choice of the preferred second-stage model.  
 In the second stage, we quantitatively test the association of property market 
dynamics with the HPR policy via three alternative models. We first estimate: 
 =  + 1() +                                          (2A)           
where 1() indicates if the policy is in force (i.e., τ ≥ 1).  tests whether there is 
a mean shift in one of the measurements of housing market after the policy adoption. An 
alternative specification is 
 =  + 1() + " +                                      (2B) 
which includes a linear time trend, , to adjust for differential preexisting trends in the 
adopting cities.  
 Equation (2A) and (2B) test for the existence of mean shift in real estate market after 
the policy’s implementation. However, the full impact of the policy may change over 
time as the individuals may find various niches to avoid the housing purchase obstacles 
set by the policy.8 We therefore estimate the third specification: 
                           =  + 1() + " + #1(() × ) +  .             (2C) 
                                                          
8
 There are quite a few anecdotal evidences reported by the media that real estate agencies prepare 
fraudulent documents for tax and social security payment to help their customers to buy the houses.  
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From this specification, we report the impact of the policy four quarters after its 
enforcement as  + 4#.9 For the second stage equations (2A)-(2C), the standard 
errors are heteroskedastic consistent. Moreover, the equations are weighted by the inverse 
of the standard error associated with the relevant   to account for differences in 
precision in the estimation of these parameters.  
  
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 5.1 Event Study Graphical Evidence 
We first present the event study graphs that not only visually depict the evolution of 
real estate market indicators around the time of HPR policy adoption but also help to 
identify the most appropriate version of equation (2). In Figure 1, each graph plots the 
estimated s from equation (1) against  . The quarter of the policy implementation, 
 = 0, is demarcated by a vertical dashed line in all figures. Additionally, all property 
market measurements are normalized to equal zero at  = −1  and noted with the 
horizontal dashed line for easy comparison. 
The figure shows that the HPR policy was effective at reversing the upward trend in 
housing prices, transaction of new residential property and land sales revenue. The NBS 
price index of newly constructed residential property (PINew, panel a) and secondary 
residential property (PISecond, panel b) fell slightly up to the fourth quarter after the 
policy is in force with PINew declining by 0.7 point while PISecond decreasing by 1.38 
point. The housing price released by the City House (priceCityhouse, panel c) fell 
considerably by RMB 772 two quarters after the policy adoption. Rental price (panel d) 
                                                          
9
 We also test the policy effects eight quarters after the adoption. The results are similar and available upon 
request. 
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remains stable within four quarters of policy enforcement, but gains strong growth 
momentum henceforth.  
The policy’s impacts on the new residential property transaction and land sales 
revenue are remarkable. Comparing with the quarter preceding the policy implementation, 
the floor space sold (SaleFloor, panel f) slumped by about 535 thousand square meter, the 
number of flat sold (SaleUnit, panel e) plummeted by 4786 unites and the sales amount 
(SaleAmount, panel g) precipitously dropped by RMB 5.45 billion at the fourth quarter of 
policy adoption. Land sales revenue (LandRevenue, panel l) plunged by RMB 6.83 
billion after the third quarter of policy enforcement.  
No policy effect is witnessed for real estate investment and property construction. On 
the contrary, their growth momentum remains strong in our sample period. This is 
because HPR policy is designed to depress the speculation, and therefore its impacts on 
the supply side may not unfold immediately due to lead-lag in housing demand and 
supply. Moreover, local governments rely heavily on property investment to achieve the 
promotion target of high GDP growth, and thus do not have incentive to suppress the 
investment even though they were forced by the Central government to dampen the 
housing price surge. Excess supply over demand is hence unavoidable and quite a few of 
ghost cities are created or inevitably appeared in China. 
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Figure 1 Event Study of HPR Policy  
The figures provide a graphic analysis of the effect of HPR policy on the twelve measurements of housing 
market indicators by depicting the estimated s from equation (1) against the event time . The quarter of 
the policy implementation,  = 0, is demarcated by a vertical dashed line in all figures. All property market 
measurements are normalized to equal zero at  = −1 and noted with the horizontal dashed line. 
 
a                                                                 b                                                              c 
 
d                                                                 e                                                              f 
 
g                                                                 h                                                              i 
 
j                                                                  k                                                              l 
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 5.2 Quantitative Evidence 
The oscillating trends for almost all real estate market indicators are observed in 
Figure 1, suggesting that the parallel trends assumption of the simple DD or mean shift 
model (i.e., equation (2A)) might be violated in many cases. This is particularly true for 
Chinese housing market where both prices and sales exhibited strong growing trends 
before the policy’s enactment. Therefore, equations (2B) and (2C) that accounts for 
differential trends are more likely to produce valid estimates.  
Tables 2-4 systematically report the policy effects estimated by the two-stage DD 
approach. Column (1) lists the estimate of   from equation (2A), which tests how  on 
average changes after the policy was mandated. Column (2) presents the estimate of   
and "  from fitting the equation (2B), where   tests for the policy effectiveness by 
accounting for the trend ("). Column (3) shows the results from equation (2C) that allow 
for a mean shift and trend break after the policy is in force. We also report the estimated 
effect of the policy four quarters after the implementation, which is equal to   + 4#.  
The regression results presented in Table 2 confirm the graphical analysis in the 
previous subsection that the HPR policy dampened the rampant housing price surge. The 
results estimated from the most comprehensive second-stage specification (equation (2C)) 
listed in column (3) indicate that four quarters after the policy was in force, the official 
property price index PINew and PIsecond declined by 3.08 and 3.88 points respectively, 
which were only 2.2 % and 2.9 % of sample mean. However, the fall in the price released 
by the Cityhouse is phenomenal, ebbing by RMB 1414 or 18.3% of the sample mean four 
quarters after the policy is enforced. No significant policy impact on the rental price is 
found a year after the policy is implemented. 
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Table 3 presents the estimation results for the new house sales and investment by the 
developers. The results derived from the equation (2C) with adjustments for differential 
pretrends imply that the number of units sold, the floor space sold and the sales amount 
plummeted averagely by 6,307 units, 643.1 thousand square meter and RMB 7.1 billion 
respectively, accounting for 46.3 %, 46.2 % and 60.3 % of the whole sample mean four 
quarter after the policy adoption. This phenomenal fall in the sales volume hints that most 
of housing purchase before the policy enforcement is for the speculation, instead of 
consumption needs. An exogenously negative demand shock induced by the HPR policy 
promptly results the plunge in both price and transaction volume. This evidence is 
consistent with Sun et al. (2013)’s finding for the response of Beijing’s housing market to 
the HPR policy. 
Similar to what we observe in Figure 1, the regression results shown in Panel D of 
Table 3 reveal that there is little evidence of a policy impact on the real estate investment. 
The regression results for the four quarters’ policy effect are even positive although 
insignificant, indicating that the investment by property developers increased despite the 
policy designed to curb the housing purchase. These findings are reinforced by the 
estimation results for the floor space started and under construction presented in Panel A 
and B of Table 4 where the policy is found to be ineffective in taming the massive 
property construction boom. 
The reduction in land price and sales revenue is strongly related with the policy. The 
results presented in Panel C and D of Table 4 suggest that the land sales revenue slumped 
by RMB 6.5 billion four quarters after the policy is mandated. This implies that the top-
down effort in curbing the housing prices surge via the HPR policy could hardly be 
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supported by the local authorities that rely excessively on the revenue from land sales to 
finance their spending and investment in infrastructure.  
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Table 2 Trend Break Estimates of the Policy Effect on the Sales Price and Rental Price 
This table presents the regression results for the NBS property prices index, as well as the transaction and rental price 
released by the City House. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the estimation results for the specifications of 2A, 2B and 2C, 
respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. PINew    
: l(Policy) 1.17* -1.23 -1.22 
(0.65) (1.12) (0.98) 
": Time Trend  0.28** 0.55*** 
 (0.11) (0.15) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   -0.47** 
  (0.20) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   -3.08** 
p-value 
  [0.02] 
Observations 17 17 17 
Panel B. PISecond    
: l(Policy) 0.71 -2.13** -2.12** 
(0.61) (0.92) (0.75) 
": Time Trend  0.33*** 0.59*** 
 (0.09) (0.12) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   -0.44** 
  (0.16) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   -3.88*** 
p-value 
  [0.00] 
Observations 17 17 17 
Panel C. price.Cityhouse    
: l(Policy) 49.73 -644.37** -653.72*** 
(168.01) (272.27) (124.49) 
": Time Trend  81.88** 195.35*** 
 (27.78) (20.00) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   -190.22*** 
  (25.89) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   -1,414.00*** 
p-Value 
  [0.00] 
Observations 17 17 17 
Panel D. Rental    
: l(Policy) 0.99** -0.92* -0.91** 
(0.38) (0.51) (0.39) 
": Time Trend  0.23*** 0.06 
 (0.05) (0.06) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   0.27*** 
  (0.08) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   0.18 
p-Value 
  [0.73] 
Observations 17 17 17 
27 
 
Table 3 Trend Break Estimates of the Policy Effect on Transaction and Investment 
This table presents the regression results for sale unit, sale floor and sale amount for new homes as well as investment 
by the developers. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the estimation results for the specifications of 2A, 2B and 2C, 
respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. SaleUnit    
: l(Policy) 718.38 -4,807.25*** -4,805.95*** 
(977.99) (1,092.21) (1,015.79) 
": Time Trend  650.04*** 870.61*** 
 (111.28) (161.19) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   -375.26* 
  (210.25) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   -6,307.00*** 
p-Value 
  [0.00] 
Observations 17 17 17 
Panel B. SaleFloor    
: l(Policy) 22.74 -483.38*** -483.20*** 
(94.51) (117.85) (109.93) 
": Time Trend  59.55*** 83.06*** 
 (12.01) (17.45) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   -40.00 
  (22.76) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   -643.10*** 
p-Value 
  [0.00] 
Observations 17 17 17 
Panel C. SaleAmount    
: l(Policy) 1,161.90 -4,192.73** -4,191.55*** 
(1,102.66) (1,574.54) (1,311.04) 
": Time Trend  630.05*** 1,058.19*** 
 (160.44) (208.16) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   -727.98** 
  (271.43) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   -7,103.00*** 
p-Value 
  [0.00] 
Observations 17 17 17 
Panel D. Investment    
: l(Policy) 4,589.70*** -263.23 -266.99 
 (773.39) (575.98) (566.02) 
": Time Trend  570.32*** 486.77*** 
 
 (58.65) (89.34) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   143.11 
 
  (116.93) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   305.43 
p-Value 
  [0.44] 
Observations 17 17 17 
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Table 4 Trend Break Estimates of the Policy Effect on Construction and Land Sales 
This table presents the regression results for the floor space started, floor space under construction, land price and land 
sales revenue. Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the estimation results for the specifications of 2A, 2B and 2C, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. FloorStarted    
: l(Policy) 272.22*** 72.73 74.97 
 (89.94) (176.17) (162.77) 
": Time Trend  23.44 59.54** 
 
 (17.94) (25.65) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   -61.98* 
 
  (33.61) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   -172.9 
p-Value 
  [0.20] 
Observations 17 17 17 
Panel B. FloorUnderConstruction    
: l(Policy) 4,078.21*** 94.19 90.83 
 (699.61) (772.78) (792.20) 
": Time Trend  468.20*** 414.05*** 
 
 (78.71) (124.84) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   92.98 
 
  (163.60) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   462.76 
p-Value 
  [0.66] 
Observations 17 17 17 
Panel C. LandPrice    
: l(Policy) 338.44 -724.83 -719.30 
 (527.08) (1,041.97) (1,012.22) 
": Time Trend  125.05 291.01* 
 
 (106.17) (160.14) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   -283.58 
 
  (209.33) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   -1,853.00 
p-Value 
  [0.18] 
Observations 17 17 17 
Panel D. LandRevenue    
: l(Policy) -599.38 -2,778.28 -2,759.87* 
 (907.36) (1,756.27) (1,311.45) 
": Time Trend  256.26 808.56*** 
 
 (178.95) (207.48) 
#: l(Policy) × time trend   -943.73*** 
 
  (271.21) 
4-quarter effect =  + 4#   -6,534.00*** 
p-Value 
  [0.00] 
Observations 17 17 17 
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5.3 Robustness Check: Structural Break Test 
This subsection employs the structural break test developed by Greenstone and 
Hanna (2014) to check the robustness of applying the two-stage DD approach for this 
study. The basic idea is to assess if there is a structural break in the policy parameters (i.e., 
 and #) estimated from the second-stage specification of equation (2C) around the 
time of policy implementation. The test first identifies the time at which the largest 
change in parameters (proxied by the largest change in the F-statistics) occurs and then 
generates p-values to judge if the changes in those parameters are different from zero. A 
significant break around the time of policy implementation, i.e. τ = 0, or some quarters 
after τ = 0 would prove the existence of a policy effect from the DD results. In contrast, 
failure to find a break or finding of a break significantly before the time of policy 
adoption hints the ineffectiveness of the policy.  
We use the Quandt likelihood ratio (QLR) statistic to select the maximum value of 
the F-statistics to assess the existence of a break at an unknown date. Figure 2 and Table 
5 report the test results. For the official property price index of newly constructed (PINew) 
and secondary residential house (PISecond), the figure does not show any structural 
breaks after the policy implementation. Although the QLR statistic identifies significant 
breaks, they occur four quarters preceding the event, implying the ineffectiveness of the 
policy in curbing the growth of house price. This is in line with our findings in the 
previous two subsections that the effect of HPR policy on the official price index is 
relatively small. However, the test on the price released by the private agent of City 
House (priceCityhouse) is significant, implying the precipitous drop of housing price at 
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the time of policy enforcement, i.e. τ = 0. A significant break is found for the rental price 
at τ = 5, corresponding to the upward trend observed also at τ = 5 in Figure 2. 
With respect to the three indicators gauging transactions, Figure 2 evidently picks the 
occurrence of the biggest F-statistics at τ = 0. Moreover, Table 5 reveals that the null 
hypothesis of no break at τ = 0 can be significantly rejected for the number of units and 
floor space sold. These findings further prove that the policy causes significant and sharp 
decline in the property transaction volume.  
The structural break test results for the real estate investment, floor space started and 
construction are broadly supportive on the findings of the previous two subsections. The 
breaks representing by the largest F-statistics are found at τ = 3, 4 and -4 respectively 
where the null hypothesis of zero effect cannot be rejected, confirming that the policy do 
not change the construction boom finally leading to the oversupply of residential property.   
The QRL test shown in Figure 2 for the land sales revenue evidently selects τ = 1 as 
the event time with the most substantive break. Table 5 reinforces that the null hypothesis 
of no break at τ = 3 can be rejected at high significance. This result further proves the 
decline of land sales revenue triggered by the HPR policy.  
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Figure 2 F-statistics from QLR Test 
The figure shows the structural break tests using Quandt likelihood ratio (QLR) statistic. The horizontal axis is the 
event time τ. The vertical axis is the F-statistics for the QLR tests.  
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Table 5 Structural Break Analysis 
Table 5 presents the results of structural break tests using the QLR test statistic and the corresponding 
quarter of the break in the data estimated from the specification of equation (2C). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 Quarter of maximum F-statistics QLR test statistic 
PINew -4 18.24*** 
PISecond -4 11.48** 
Price.Cityhouse 0 40.39*** 
Rental 5 28.96*** 
SaleUnit 0 12.79** 
SaleFloor 0 11.21** 
SaleAmount 0 8.71 
Investment 3 2.53 
FloorStarted 4 4.88 
FloorUnderConstruction -4 2.55 
LandPrice 5 3.02 
LandRevenue 1 10.55** 
 
6. CROSS-SECTIONAL TESTS OF POLICY EFFECTS  
Since real estate market carries quite a few of local characteristics, the effect of the 
HPR policy on different types of cities can be quite different. In this section, we compare 
the policy effects across cities according to their reliance on land sales for fiscal revenue, 
dependence on real estate investments for economic growth, and pace of urban expansion. 
6.1 Qualitative Evidence 
A. Land Finance  
Land and housing are important fiscal sources in many countries, but China’s land 
finance, or heavy and growing fiscal reliance on land sales revenue by the local 
authorities, carries several important characteristics that generate far-reaching impacts on 
the real estate market.  
The land finance is rooted in the Chinese intergovernmental fiscal relationship 
established in 1994. Local governments currently receive half the nation’s fiscal revenue 
but are responsible for 80% of spending (The Economist, 2014). Facing heavy 
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expenditure responsibilities, local governments have to depend heavily on off-budgetary 
sources such as profits from expropriating farmers’ land, revenue related to land sales and 
transactions, and so forth (Huang and Chen, 2012). As shown in Figure 3, the ratio of 
land sales to municipal government budgetary revenue10 increased from less than 1% in 
the early 1990s to around 80% in 2010. Among our 70 sample cities, the average ratio of 
land sales revenue to budgetary revenue for the years of 2001-2011 shows large 
variations across cities ranging from 11% to 117%. Cities having meager fiscal resources 
or tremendous needs for infrastructure investment exhibit higher degree of reliance on 
land finance. 
Figure 3 Ratio of Land Sales Revenue to Budgetary Revenue of Municipal Governments 
The data for the years of 1989-2009 is from Barth et al. (2012) and the rest is calculated by the authors 
where the data of land sales revenue is obtained from China Land & Resources Yearbook (2011-2013) and 
the data of budgetary revenue is from CEIC. 
 
 
 
Besides, land finance builds up a territory-based coalition between local 
governments and real estate developers both of whom cash in their political power and 
expand their wealth in a reciprocal way through the increasing intensification of land use 
(Fu, 2014). For example, by investing in the urban infrastructure with the land sales 
revenue the local authorities could prop up the sales of real estate and facilitate the flow 
                                                          
10
 Budgetary revenue consists mainly of tax revenue and state-owned enterprise contributions. 
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of capital and goods, which in turn enlarge the ‘tax base’ of the city (Logan and Molotch, 
2007). 
Furthermore, tremendous negative externalities and social costs have arisen due to 
land finance, including soaring housing prices, forcible land seizures in cities, rural land 
expropriation, unrests related to land and housing problems (Lin, 2009) and debt-laden 
local fiscal system (Tsui, 2011). In terms of the impacts on real estate market, although 
the immense land sales revenue spurs the local authorities to increase the supply of land 
for urban residential purposes (Chen et al., 2011), it also inflates housing prices by 
imposing substantial yet mandatory costs on real estate development (Fu, 2014).   
B. Real Estate Investment dependence 
A considerable volume of literature has investigated the dynamic interaction between 
real estate investment and economic growth (for example, Braid, 2001; Brito and Perreira, 
2002; Coulson and Kim, 2000; Liu et al. 2002). However, the role of real estate 
investment in Chinese economy is an issue merits special scrutiny.  
China’s more than a decade of spectacular economic growth, much of it in double 
digits, is mainly achieved by the gigantic investment whose share in the total economic 
activity is as high as around 50% in 201211. As shown in Figure 4, being the most 
significant contributor to the GDP growth, the real estate investment has grown at an 
average annual pace of 23% for the last 15 years. Given its extensive industrial linkage, 
real estate investment is of particular importance to create job opportunities and hence 
stave off social unrest for China whose workforce swelled by about 145 million from 
1990 to 2008 (The Economist, 2012). Real estate-related industries, in particular, 
                                                          
11
 According to China Statistical Yearbook 2013, the capital formation rate, which is computed as the share 
of gross capital formation in the GDP by expenditure approach, amounts to 47.8% in 2012.  
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construction, steel, cement, copper and glass industries are key job providers for low 
skilled workers in China.  
Figure 4 The Importance of Real Estate Investment in the Economy 
The figure depicts the percentage of real estate investment to GDP, real estate growth rate and real estate 
investment to national fixed asset investment. The data is obtained from CEIC.  
 
 
 
Moreover, under China’s current political systems, achieving high economic growth 
is the main promotion criterion for local government officials (Cao et al., 2014). Driven 
by this target, local governments fostered reckless real estate investment across the nation, 
especially after 2008 when housing is chosen as a key part of the economic rescue plan to 
fight against the global financial crisis. However, such spectacular building boom would 
be unsustainable as the housing market matures, population ages, urbanization slows 
down, and the rate of return of investment declines (Bai et al., 2006). Empty buildings 
and ghost towns has testified to the oversupply of housing and massive misallocation of 
resources in China. 
Overinvestment in housing is more acute in smaller cities, where new drivers of 
growth are often lacking. To measure the importance of real estate investment to local 
economy, we calculate the average ratio of real estate investment to fixed asset 
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investment as well as to GDP for the years of 2005-2013. The latter ratio varies 
substantially from 4% to 50% among our 70 sample cities, with Sanya topping in the 
dependence of property investment. 
C. Urban sprawl 
China’s property boom is accompanied by the country’s impressive and 
unprecedented urbanization process whose speed has been much faster than that in 
Western countries during their industrial transformations. It took China only 30 years to 
climb from 20% of urbanization to today’s 54% while the equivalent journey took 100 
years in Britain and 60 years in America (The Economist, 2014).  
Some believe that the urbanization and internal migration is one of the most 
important forces to purport Chinese property boom (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2011; 
Wu et al., 2010). However, a very special feature of Chinese urbanization process is that 
the growth of urban area has outstripped the growth of urban residents. On average, the 
built-up areas across the country have recently been growing by 8% a year whereas their 
populations have been rising by only 5% (The Economist, 2014)12. As a result, for the 
years of 2000-2011, the urban built-up areas grow by 76.4% while the urban population 
only increases by 50.5% (Southern Weekly, 2014)13. The gap is far wider in inland cities 
with urban areas growing three times faster than their populations. In those cities where 
the urban area is expanding too fast, the stock of new housing is also soaring and hence 
might have a serious problem of structural oversupply. The ratio of urban land area in 
                                                          
12
 The rampant urban sprawl is actually the result of local governments’ ability to seize rural land at will. 
Moreover, local bureaucrats have a predilection for vast areas of concrete because massive buildings help 
to boost local officials’ egos and brand their cities. 
13
 Available at http://www.infzm.com/content/106082 
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2010 to that in 1980 released by the Beijing City Lab (BCL) 14  indicates that the 
population density in around a quarter of cities is declining as the growth of urban 
population lags behind the growth of urban area.    
6.2 Quantitative Evidence 
To assess the potential differences in policy effects arising from local variations in 
land finance reliance, real estate investment dependence or urban sprawl, we follow 
Greenstone and Hanna (2014)’s practice to divide the sample cities into those with above 
and below the median value of a given proxy, estimate separate s for these cities with 
equation (1), stacking the two sets of s obtained from the estimation of equation (2C), 
and then test whether  π + 4π# is the same for the two sets of policy adopting cities.  
Table 6 reports the test results of how the HPR policy effect four quarters after 
implementation varies in cities with above (relative to below) the median measures of 
land finance reliance, real estate investment dependence and urban expansion. Almost all 
results for the three price indicators, i.e. PINew, PISecond and Price.Cityhouse are 
significantly negative, implying that the cities with land finance reliance, real estate 
investment dependence and urban expansion pace above the median value experience 
larger decline in the housing price. Moreover, column (5) indicates that cities who have 
higher ratio of real estate investment to GDP observe more drops in housing sales. These 
findings indicate that housing market is more fragile in these cities. An external demand 
shock like the implementation of HPR policy would trigger larger corrections in them. 
                                                          
14
 The data is released at the website http://www.beijingcitylab.com/. Beijing City Lab infers urban land for 
all Chinese cities at the prefectural level and above in 1980 and 2010 from remotely sensed images. The 
ratio between urban land area in 2010 and that in 1980 is used to approximate the degree of urban 
expansion in individual cities. 
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No significant differences in investment and construction of real estate are found between 
two groups of cities, hinting the overheated property boom all over the nation. 
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Table 6 Differences in Policy Effects across Cities 
The table reports the results of how the HPR policy effect four quarters after implementation varies in cities with above 
(relative to below) the median measures of land finance reliance, real estate investment dependence and urban 
expansion. 
Land finance 
reliance 
Real Estate Investment/ 
fixed asset investment 
Real Estate 
Investment/GDP 
Urban 
Expansion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel 1. PINew     
Difference in four quarter effect -2.58 -5.14*** -4.58** -7.66*** 
p-value [0.12] [0.01] [0.01] [0.00] 
Oberservations 33 33 33 33 
Panel 2. PISecond     
Difference in four quarter effect -5.11*** -6.48*** -5.96*** -4.62*** 
p-value [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] 
Oberservations 33 33 33 33 
Panel 3. price.Cityhouse     
Difference in four quarter effect -1619*** -525.8* 140.96 -1574*** 
p-value [0.00] [0.08] [0.85] [0.00] 
Oberservations 33 33 33 33 
Panel 4. Rental     
Difference in four quarter effect -1.61* 2.15** 0.70 -0.10 
p-value [0.07] [0.02] [0.21] [0.90] 
Oberservations 33 33 33 33 
Panel 5. SaleUnit     
Difference in four quarter effect 4585.6 -1931 -5986* 938.45 
p-value [0.14] [0.55] [0.07] [0.76] 
Oberservations 33 33 33 34 
Panel 6.SaleFloor     
Difference in four quarter effect 418.74 -50.49 -656.40* -116.8 
p-value [0.12] [0.85] [0.06] [0.79] 
Oberservations 34 34 33 33 
Panel 7.SaleAmount     
Difference in four quarter effect 5071.50 881.64 -8213* -1508 
p-value [0.18] [0.77] [0.06] [0.64] 
Oberservations 34 33 33 34 
Panel 8.Investment     
Difference in four quarter effect 845.99 193.04 -1807.00 374.23 
p-value [0.53] [0.88] [0.13] [0.77] 
Oberservations 33 33 33 33 
Panel 9.FloorStarted 
    
Difference in four quarter effect -364.90 -398.50 -267.30 -140.5 
p-value [0.38] [0.32] [0.87] [0.77] 
Oberservations 34 34 34 33 
Panel 10. 
  FloorUnderConstruction     
Difference in four quarter effect -612.50 -353.70 -2039 2672.10 
p-value [0.71] [0.85] [0.22] [0.25] 
Oberservations 34 34 34 33 
Panel 11.LandPrice     
Difference in four quarter effect 1288.60 -7.25 -223.40 -1764 
p-value [0.61] [0.10] [0.94] [0.53] 
Oberservations 33 34 33 34 
Panel 12.LandRevenue 
    
Difference in four quarter effect 1331.90 -1827 -1777 -1144 
p-value [0.67] [0.59] [0.54] [0.65] 
Oberservations 33 34 33 34 
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7. CONCLUSION 
Due to the skyscraping housing prices across the nation and failure of traditional 
macroprudential policies to rein in speculation in the property market, the Chinese central 
government encourages local authorities, on a voluntary need base, to curb real 
estate speculation and stabilize housing prices by imposing the housing 
purchase restriction policy. Among our sample of 70 cities, 39 local authorities adopted 
the HPR policy starting from 2010. With a comprehensive unbalanced panel data and the 
two-stage DD approach developed by Donald and Lang (2007) and implemented by 
Greenstone and Hanna (2014), the research systematically investigates the effectiveness 
of Chinese HPR policy on the property markets. The two-stage DD approach enables us 
to draw the causality inferences without endogeneity biases.  
We find that HPR policy has negative impact on property price as well as remarkable 
effect in reducing transaction volume, indicating the effectiveness of the policy in 
dampening housing demand. However, the policy failed to restrain the nationwide 
property construction boom. Investment by property developers actually increased after 
the implementation of the policy. The cross sectional tests show that HPR policy has 
more pronounced effect on housing prices for cities with heavy reliance on real estate 
sector for fiscal revenue and economic growth.  
 Our findings cast serious doubts on the overall effectiveness of HPR in China. Such 
a policy seems to work temporarily well to stabilize housing prices and repress housing 
transaction volumes, but it does not correct a possible housing market bubble since it fails 
to correct excessive supply problems due to circumvention and misalignment of 
government incentives. 
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From the policy perspective, the findings of this paper suggest that the policies 
designed to choke the demand without touching the fundamental issues, in particular, 
lack of saving vehicles, the over-dependence of economic growth on real estate 
investment and the heavy fiscal reliance of local governments on real estate-related 
income, could hardly solve the problem of boiling bubbles in the property market, posing 
risks to the economic stability.  
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Appendix I 
Table A1 Variable descriptions 
Variable Definition Unit Source 
PINew Property price index: newly constructed residential property 2005Q2=100 NBS, CEIC 
PISecond Property price index: secondary residential property 2005Q2=100 NBS, CEIC 
Price.Cityhouse Price of secondary residential property RMB per square meter City House 
Rental Rental Price of residential property RMB per square meter City House 
SaleUnit Number of flats sold: newly constructed residential property Unit CREIS, CEIC 
SaleFloor Floor space sold: newly constructed residential property thousand square meters CREIS, CEIC 
SaleAmount Sales amount of newly constructed residential property  RMB million CREIS, CEIC 
Investment Investment on new residential property seasonality adjusted RMB million NBS, CEIC 
Floorstarted Floor space started thousand square meters CREIS, CEIC 
Floorconsturction Floor space under construction thousand square meters CREIS, CEIC 
LandPrice Land Price RMB per square meter CREIS 
LandRevenue Land Sales Revenue RMB million CREIS 
Population Resident Population thousand person CREIS, city and provincial yearbook   
DPI Disposable Income per Capita Seasonality Adjusted RMB NBS, CEIC 
GDPPC GDP per capita RMB NBS, CEIC 
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Table A2 Implementation of housing purchase restriction policies across 70 cities 
No. Name Starting date Ending date 
Policy 
implementation No. Name Starting date Ending date 
Policy 
implementation 
1 Beijing 01-05-2010 YES 36 Tangshan NO 
2 Tianjin 01-03-2011 01-08-2014 YES 37 Qingdao NO 
3 Shijiazhuang 21-02-2011 26-09-2014 YES 38 Baotou NO 
4 Taiyuan 19-02-2011 04-08-2014 YES 39 Dandong NO 
5 Hohhot 31-03-2011 24-06-2014 YES 40 Jinzhou NO 
6 Shenyang 25-02-2011 10-06-2014 YES 41 Jilin NO 
7 Dalian 19-11-2010 03-09-2014 YES 42 Mudanjiang NO 
8 Changchun 28-01-2011 19-07-2014 YES 43 Wuxi 20-02-2011 30-08-2014 YES 
9 Harbin 28-02-2011 16-08-2014 YES 44 Yangzhou NO 
10 Shanghai 01-02-2011 YES 45 Xuzhou 01-05-2011 01-08-2014 YES 
11 Nanjing 19-02-2011 21-09-2014 YES 46 Wenzhou 14-03-2011 30-07-2014 YES 
12 Hangzhou 01-03-2011 29-08-2014 YES 47 Jinhua 31-03-2011 01-08-2014 YES 
13 Ningbo 22-02-2011 30-07-2014 YES 48 Bengbu NO 
14 Hefei 31-03-2011 02-08-2014 YES 49 Anqing NO 
15 Fuzhou 10-10-2010 01-08-2014 YES 50 Quanzhou NO 
16 Xiamen 01-10-2010 01-07-2014 YES 51 Jiujiang NO 
17 Nanchang 01-02-2011 12-08-2014 YES 52 Ganzhou NO 
18 Jinan 21-01-2011 10-07-2014 YES 53 Yantai NO 
19 Qingdao 31-01-2011 01-08-2014 YES 54 Jining NO 
20 Zhengzhou 31-12-2010 09-08-2014 YES 55 Luoyang NO 
21 Wuhan 14-01-2011 24-09-2014 YES 56 Pingdingshan NO 
22 Changsha 04-03-2011 06-08-2014 YES 57 Yichang NO 
23 Guangzhou 15-10-2010 YES 58 Xiangyang NO 
24 Shenzhen 30-09-2010 YES 59 Yueyang NO 
25 Nanning 01-03-2011 01-10-2014 YES 60 Changde NO 
26 Haikou 28-02-2011 22-07-2014 YES 61 Huizhou NO 
27 Chongqing NO 62 Zhanjiang NO 
28 Chengdu 15-02-2011 22-07-2014 YES 63 Shaoguan NO 
29 Guiyang 20-02-2011 01-09-2014 YES 64 Guilin NO 
30 Kunming 18-01-2011 11-08-2014 YES 65 Beihai NO 
31 Xian 25-02-2011 01-09-2014 YES 66 Sanya 03-03-2011 07-10-2014 YES 
32 Lanzhou 05-11-2010 03-09-2014 YES 67 Luzhou NO 
33 Xining 25-02-2011 10-09-2014 YES 68 Nanchong NO 
34 Yinchuan 22-02-2011 22-08-2014 YES 69 Zunyi NO 
35 Urumqi 28-02-2011 01-08-2014 YES 70 Dali NO 
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Figure A1 Location of 70 sample cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
